Travel history among persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in the United States, December 2020-February 2021.

The first three SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic lineages classified as variants of concern (VOCs) in the United States (U.S.) from December 15, 2020 to February 28, 2021, Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), and Gamma (P.1) lineages, were initially detected internationally. This investigation examined available travel history of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases reported in the U.S. in whom laboratory testing showed one of these initial VOCs. Travel history, demographics, and health outcomes for a convenience sample of persons infected with a SARS-CoV-2 VOC from December 15, 2020 through February 28, 2021 were provided by 35 state and city health departments, and proportion reporting travel was calculated. Of 1,761 confirmed VOC cases analyzed, 1,368 had available data on travel history. Of those with data on travel history, 1,168 (85%) reported no travel preceding laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 and only 105 (8%) reported international travel during the 30 days preceding a positive SARS-CoV-2 test or symptom onset. International travel was reported by 92/1,304 (7%) of persons infected with the Alpha variant, 7/55 (22%) with Beta, and 5/9 (56%) with Gamma. Of the first three SARS-CoV-2 lineages designated as VOCs in the U.S., international travel was common only among the few Gamma cases. Most persons infected with Alpha and Beta variant reported no travel history, therefore, community transmission of these VOCs was likely common in the U.S. by March 2021. These findings underscore the importance of global surveillance using whole genome sequencing to detect and inform mitigation strategies for emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOCs.

US-Mexico binational COVID-19 cases in southern California border counties, California, February-June 2020.

Background: COVID-19 has had a significant public health impact on both the United States and Mexico. Cross-border mobility between southern California and Mexico raises questions of transmission trends between these jurisdictions. The objective of this project was to describe binational cases amongst California US-Mexico border county COVID-19 cases and compare incidence trends to cross-border Mexico jurisdictions. Methods: Interview data from persons with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections in San Diego County, CA and Imperial County, CA from February to June 2020 were reviewed for binational cases; demographics and connection to COVID-19 outbreaks were assessed. Graphs of COVID-19 incidence in San Diego County and Imperial County were compared to incidence graphs in cross-border Mexico jurisdictions of Tijuana and Mexicali. Results: Persons with COVID-19 and a binational case were older, more likely to be Hispanic, and reside in a border ZIP code than those without. Binational cases were a small proportion and tracked with overall cases during the study period. Conclusions: Binational cases had different trends than non-binational cases of SARS-CoV-2 in San Diego and Imperial counties from February to June 2020. Findings could inform SARS-CoV-2 mitigation strategies specific to the US-Mexico land border, particularly recommendations regarding cross-border land travel.

SARS-CoV-2 infection risk among vaccinated and unvaccinated household members during the Alpha variant surge - Denver, Colorado, and San Diego, California, January-April 2021.

BACKGROUND: COVID-19 vaccination reduces SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission. However, evidence is emerging on the degree of protection across variants and in high-transmission settings. To better understand the protection afforded by vaccination specifically in a high-transmission setting, we examined household transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during a period of high community incidence with predominant SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 (Alpha) variant, among vaccinated and unvaccinated contacts. METHODS: We conducted a household transmission investigation in San Diego County, California, and Denver, Colorado, during January-April 2021. Households were enrolled if they had at least one person with documented SARS-CoV-2 infection. We collected nasopharyngeal swabs, blood, demographic information, and vaccination history from all consenting household members. We compared infection risks (IRs), RT-PCR cycle threshold values, SARS-CoV-2 culture results, and antibody statuses among vaccinated and unvaccinated household contacts. RESULTS: We enrolled 493 individuals from 138 households. The SARS-CoV-2 variant was identified from 121/138 households (88%). The most common variants were Alpha (75/121, 62%) and Epsilon (19/121, 16%). There were no households with discordant lineages among household members. One fully vaccinated secondary case was symptomatic (13%); the other 5 were asymptomatic (87%). Among unvaccinated secondary cases, 105/108 (97%) were symptomatic. Among 127 households with a single primary case, the IR for household contacts was 45% (146/322; 95% Confidence Interval [CI] 40-51%). The observed IR was higher in unvaccinated (130/257, 49%, 95% CI 45-57%) than fully vaccinated contacts (6/26, 23%, 95% CI 11-42%). A lower proportion of households with a fully vaccinated primary case had secondary cases (1/5, 20%) than households with an unvaccinated primary case (66/108, 62%). CONCLUSIONS: Although SARS-CoV-2 infections in vaccinated household contacts were reported in this high transmission setting, full vaccination protected against SARS-CoV-2 infection. These findings further support the protective effect of COVID-19 vaccination and highlight the need for ongoing vaccination among eligible persons.

Household Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Alpha Variant-United States, 2021.

BACKGROUND: In Spring 2021, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.1.7 (Alpha) became the predominant variant in the United States. Research suggests that Alpha has increased transmissibility compared with non-Alpha lineages. We estimated household secondary infection risk (SIR), assessed characteristics associated with transmission, and compared symptoms of persons with Alpha and non-Alpha infections. METHODS: We followed households with SARS-CoV-2 infection for 2 weeks in San Diego County and metropolitan Denver, January to April 2021. We collected epidemiologic information and biospecimens for serology, reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), and whole-genome sequencing. We stratified SIR and symptoms by lineage and identified characteristics associated with transmission using generalized estimating equations. RESULTS: We investigated 127 households with 322 household contacts; 72 households (56.7%) had member(s) with secondary infections. SIRs were not significantly higher for Alpha (61.0% [95% confidence interval, 52.4-69.0%]) than non-Alpha (55.6% [44.7-65.9%], P = .49). In households with Alpha, persons who identified as Asian or Hispanic/Latino had significantly higher SIRs than those who identified as White (P = .01 and .03, respectively). Close contact (eg, kissing, hugging) with primary cases was associated with increased transmission for all lineages. Persons with Alpha infection were more likely to report constitutional symptoms than persons with non-Alpha (86.9% vs 76.8%, P = .05). CONCLUSIONS: Household SIRs were similar for Alpha and non-Alpha. Comparable SIRs may be due to saturation of transmission risk in households due to extensive close contact, or true lack of difference in transmission rates. Avoiding close contact within households may reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission for all lineages among household members.

Comparison of Home Antigen Testing With RT-PCR and Viral Culture During the Course of SARS-CoV-2 Infection.

Importance: As self-collected home antigen tests become widely available, a better understanding of their performance during the course of SARS-CoV-2 infection is needed. Objective: To evaluate the diagnostic performance of home antigen tests compared with reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and viral culture by days from illness onset, as well as user acceptability. Design, Setting, and Participants: This prospective cohort study was conducted from January to May 2021 in San Diego County, California, and metropolitan Denver, Colorado. The convenience sample included adults and children with RT-PCR-confirmed infection who used self-collected home antigen tests for 15 days and underwent at least 1 nasopharyngeal swab for RT-PCR, viral culture, and sequencing. Exposures: SARS-CoV-2 infection. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcome was the daily sensitivity of home antigen tests to detect RT-PCR-confirmed cases. Secondary outcomes included the daily percentage of antigen test, RT-PCR, and viral culture results that were positive, and antigen test sensitivity compared with same-day RT-PCR and cultures. Antigen test use errors and acceptability were assessed for a subset of participants. Results: This study enrolled 225 persons with RT-PCR-confirmed infection (median [range] age, 29 [1-83] years; 117 female participants [52%]; 10 [4%] Asian, 6 [3%] Black or African American, 50 [22%] Hispanic or Latino, 3 [1%] Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, 145 [64%] White, and 11 [5%] multiracial individuals) who completed 3044 antigen tests and 642 nasopharyngeal swabs. Antigen test sensitivity was 50% (95% CI, 45%-55%) during the infectious period, 64% (95% CI, 56%-70%) compared with same-day RT-PCR, and 84% (95% CI, 75%-90%) compared with same-day cultures. Antigen test sensitivity peaked 4 days after illness onset at 77% (95% CI, 69%-83%). Antigen test sensitivity improved with a second antigen test 1 to 2 days later, particularly early in the infection. Six days after illness onset, antigen test result positivity was 61% (95% CI, 53%-68%). Almost all (216 [96%]) surveyed individuals reported that they would be more likely to get tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection if home antigen tests were available over the counter. Conclusions and Relevance: The results of this cohort study of home antigen tests suggest that sensitivity for SARS-CoV-2 was moderate compared with RT-PCR and high compared with viral culture. The results also suggest that symptomatic individuals with an initial negative home antigen test result for SARS-CoV-2 infection should test again 1 to 2 days later because test sensitivity peaked several days after illness onset and improved with repeated testing.

COVID-19 Case Investigations Among Federally Quarantined Evacuees From Wuhan, China, and Exposed Personnel at a US Military Base, United States, February 5-21, 2020.

In February 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, 232 evacuees from Wuhan, China, were placed under federal 14-day quarantine upon arrival at a US military base in San Diego, California. We describe the monitoring of evacuees and responders for symptoms of COVID-19, case and contact investigations, infection control procedures, and lessons learned to inform future quarantine protocols for evacuated people from a hot spot resulting from a novel pathogen. Thirteen (5.6%) evacuees had COVID-19-compatible symptoms and 2 (0.9%) had laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2. Two case investigations identified 43 contacts; 3 (7.0%) contacts had symptoms but tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Daily symptom and temperature screening of evacuees and enacted infection control procedures resulted in rapid case identification and isolation and no detected secondary transmission among evacuees or responders. Lessons learned highlight the challenges associated with public health response to a novel pathogen and the evolution of mitigation strategies as knowledge of the pathogen evolves.

Emergence and rapid transmission of SARS-CoV-2 B.1.1.7 in the United States.

The highly transmissible B.1.1.7 variant of SARS-CoV-2, first identified in the United Kingdom, has gained a foothold across the world. Using S gene target failure (SGTF) and SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequencing, we investigated the prevalence and dynamics of this variant in the United States (US), tracking it back to its early emergence. We found that, while the fraction of B.1.1.7 varied by state, the variant increased at a logistic rate with a roughly weekly doubling rate and an increased transmission of 40%-50%. We revealed several independent introductions of B.1.1.7 into the US as early as late November 2020, with community transmission spreading it to most states within months. We show that the US is on a similar trajectory as other countries where B.1.1.7 became dominant, requiring immediate and decisive action to minimize COVID-19 morbidity and mortality.

2019-nCoV: The Identify-Isolate-Inform (3I) Tool Applied to a Novel Emerging Coronavirus.

2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) is an emerging infectious disease closely related to MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV that was first reported in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China in December 2019. As of January 2020, cases of 2019-nCoV are continuing to be reported in other Eastern Asian countries as well as in the United States, Europe, Australia, and numerous other countries. An unusually high volume of domestic and international travel corresponding to the beginning of the 2020 Chinese New Year complicated initial identification and containment of infected persons. Due to the rapidly rising number of cases and reported deaths, all countries should be considered at risk of imported 2019-nCoV. Therefore, it is essential for prehospital, clinic, and emergency department personnel to be able to rapidly assess 2019-nCoV risk and take immediate actions if indicated. The Identify-Isolate-Inform (3I) Tool, originally conceived for the initial detection and management of Ebola virus and later adjusted for other infectious agents, can be adapted for any emerging infectious disease. This paper reports a modification of the 3I Tool for use in the initial detection and management of patients under investigation for 2019-nCoV. After initial assessment for symptoms and epidemiological risk factors, including travel to affected areas and exposure to confirmed 2019-nCoV patients within 14 days, patients are classified in a risk-stratified system. Upon confirmation of a suspected 2019-nCoV case, affected persons must immediately be placed in airborne infection isolation and the appropriate public health agencies notified. This modified 3I Tool will assist emergency and primary care clinicians, as well as out-of-hospital providers, in effectively managing persons with suspected or confirmed 2019-nCoV.